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Article 4

THE DE LEGIBUS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J.
The citizens of the Republic of the Scholars commemorate
this year the Fourth Centenary of Francisco Suarez (15481617), the Doctor Eximius. The son of a lawyer, Suarez
first studied law; but coming under the influence of Father
Ramirez, one of the first disciples of Ignatius of Loyola, he
entered the Society of Jesus and was assigned first as teacher
of philosophy, then of theology to various colleges and universities. Finally, he was appointed to the highest chair of
theology at the University Coimbra, at that time the most
famous university of the Iberian Peninsula.
Though Suarez began to write and publish at the comparatively late age of about 45, his opera omnia (not taking into consideration his many as yet unpublished memoranda) extend to twenty-six volumes and have been issued
in many editions, the latest of which is the Paris edition of
1856 by Berton.
Suarez is considered by many to be the greatest theologian
of the second flowering of Scholasticism in Spain's Golden
Age. Even in modern theological treatises it is often to be
noted that he is quoted more frequently than any other
theologian with the exception of St. Thomas and St. Augustine. He and his contemporary and fellow Jesuit, Molina,
are the originators of that doctrine in the Theology of Grace
which is known under the name Congruism, or Molinism,
and which is still a kind of official doctrine of the Jesuit
theologians. Of his Disputationes Metaphysicae Grabmann
says: "It is the most comprehensive systematic representation of Metaphysics that we have . . . a monumental work
of the scholastic way of philosophical speculation." 1 In recent times the interest in-and the influence of-Suarez, the
theologian and philosopher, is clearly illustrated by the
1 Martin Grabmann: Die Disputationes Metaphysicae ides Franz Suarez, etc.,
in Six FRANz SuaEZ, 16 and 44 (Innsbruck, 1917).
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lengthy bibliography contained in Pensamiento, the philosophical quarterly of the Jesuits in Madrid, covering pages
610-637 of its special volume published in commemoration
of the Fourth Centenary of Suarez.
Yet all of this would not be enough to justify an article
on Suarez in a law review. But Suarez is no less famous for
his legal and political philosophy than for his theological and
philosophical works. His fame in the former fields and his
importance for the student of law are founded on his two
volume work, De Legibus et de Deo Legislatore, which has
gone through many editions in Spain, Germany, France,
Italy and England,2 and on the famous Defense of the Faith
against the Errors of the Anglican Sect which contains a
devastating criticism of the Divine Right of Kings theory
as well as an excellent defense of the English martyrs under
Elizabeth and James I. This work, too, has been published
in many editions, the latest at Barcelona in 1882. Both
works aroused the ire of absolutist monarchs, and copies of
them were burned by the hangman in formal ceremonies in
France and in England.
It is these two works, but especially the two volumes of
De Legibus, which give Suarez his eminent place in the field
of legal and political philosophy and, consequently, might be
of some interest to the student of these disciplines. and of
law. Numerous scholars have testified to that thesis. Hugo
Grotius makes frequent acknowledgment of his debt to
Suarez.' The De Legibus, together with the Metaphysics,
was used and consulted at even the protestant universities
in Germany. Among modern scholars, the famous French
jurist, Maurice Hauriou, blaming those who made no use
of the immense treasure of legal and political reflections to
be found in such works as the De Legibus, confesses that he
2 First editions: Coimbra (1612), Lyon and Antwerp (1613); last editions:
Paris (1856) and Naples (1872).
3 Cp. the remarks in his letter to John Cordesius (EPIsT. CL IV) about the
influence of Suarez on Grotius; cp. J. Larequi, S.J., in RAzoNr Y FE, Madrid,
III, 226 (1929).
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himself got his best inspirations from them and was saved
from falling into grievous errors by studying them.4 The
Italian, G. de Vecchio, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of
Law, says that Suarez' De Legibus is one of the most complete systematic treatises of legal and political philosophy.
The German scholar, K. Jodl, says that the De Legibus of
Suarez is the most eminent work of Late-Scholasticism in
legal philosophy compared with which Melanchthon's Epitome pkilosophiae moralis and the works of other protestant
authors before Grotius make a rather poor impression. J.
Kohler, law professor at the University of Berlin, contends
that if the theory of the Natural Law should be reviveda step he considers necessary for the better foundation of
International Law-then this revival must be based on the
works of the great Spaniards, especially those of Suarez, and
not on Grotius.5 In the United States, James Scott Brown
has written an enthusiastic appreciation of Suarez' legal
philosophy in its influence on the Law of Nations. Finally,
to close these testimonials with a quite recent one by an
indubitably high authority, Pius XII, speaking of the doctrine of the Natural Law in the philosophia perennis, says
that this doctrine has reached its highest form in the works
of a St. Thomas Aquinas and a Suarez. 6 Hence the students
of legal and political philosophy and the jurists with equal
right commemorate this year the Fourth Centenary of
Suarez as do the theologians and the philosophers. And for
the same reason a short essay on De Legibus, the principal
work of Suarez, might justly interest the jurists and the
readers of this review.
4 De Vecchio: LECON
from the Italian]).
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II.
Suarez was the first scholastic philosopher to desist from
the customary method of merely commenting on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Instead, he wrote an original work on
Metaphysics although he adhered, of course, mostly to the
fundamentals of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. He follows a similar method in his De Legibus et de Deo Legistatore in relation to the Summa Theologica which Ignatius of
Loyola had made "the" rule of theological teaching in the
Jesuit order; he does not compose a commentary on the
famous Quaestiones 90-109 of the I, II ae of the Summa
as many earlier theologians, such as Cajetanus and Antonine
of Florence, had done. He treats the same subject matter
as do the above-mentioned Quaestiones of the Summa, but
he treats them according to his own plan and following an
elaborated system, going into the old problems in an exhaustive way, presenting all sides of a problem as they had been
discussed by previous writers, correcting misinterpretations
which nominalist writers had introduced and, finally, approaching and handling the many new problems which had
arisen with the Reformation, the writings of a Macchiavelli,
the conquest of the Americas, the appearance of the modern
nation-state and the much-posited theory of divine right of
monarchical absolutism. He knows the writings of the
Church Fathers, those of the great Schoolmen, the works of
the great masters of the Civil Law at the University of
Bologna, the immense literature of the Canonists. In questions which, one might think, had been exhaustively answered by St. Thomas, he often finds new aspects; he catalogues all the objections that have been opposed to a certain
doctrine through the centuries, and then he tries meticulously
to answer them. One need but read a few of the more than
124 chapters of the first volume of De Legibus, especially
of the Second and Third Books, to be impressed by the
immense learning displayed and by the superior handling
of source material-may that be the law of Spain, of Por-
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tugal, of France, the statutes of Italian City-Republics, the
Civil Law and its commentaries, or the whole ecclesiastical
law collected in the Corpus Jwis Canonici since about
1582-by the penetrating analysis of all the sides of a question and the careful and prudent weighing of the pros and
cons of a problem. That, together with a clear and lucid
style written in the Latin of the humanist school, will always
captivate the mind of a true jurist. Suarez is always cautious
in his judgment, never apodictic or self-sure; how often, for
example, does he say that a certain solution appears to him
"~more pleasing" or "more probable." Many scholars give
special stress to the objectivity and the extreme care Suarez
takes in representing the theories and opinions of his opponents; it can, therefore, be said that the De Legibus is truly
"encyclopedic" and at the same time profound.
If one were to ask why a scholar who is primarily a theologian should go so intimately into legal and political theory,
the natural and the human law, Suarez himself offers the
answer: God is the Legislator Universal, the ultimate source
of all laws and of all powers and, thus, the theologian must
be concerned with the laws. Furthermore, the theologian's
responsibility is also to advise the consciences, the rectitude
of which consists in obedience to just and right laws. We
should remember that at the time of Suarez the "Education
of the Prince" was still considered to be a theological and
moral task. Thus, for instance, he dedicates his Defense of
the Catholic Faith against James I of England to the "Kings
and Princes of the Christian World." Again, as is well known,
Suarez died after successfully settling a conflict between the
7 Vittoria, the originator of the second flowering of Scholasticism, is
directly called on by the Spanish kings to counsel them on the moral and juridical

problems of the Conquista. Mariana, a contemporary of Suarez, wrote his famous
work, De Rege et de Regis Instit,-tione, as a book of good counsel to rulers

and dedicated it to his pupil, Phillip IH-and could do so in spite of his invectives against tyranny, in spite of his thesis that the people are greater than the
prince-warning his pupil against the Macchiavellians (though, again, The Prince
of Macchiavelli is on its side a textbook of politics for the Prince, although a

pragmatist and rather amoral one).
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secular government and the ecclesiastical authorities of Lisbon.7 A further explanation and justification of this interest
in the laws lies in the fact that the theologian must be a
philosopher; the Roman jurists and the Greek philosophers
from Plato on knew that the Law must be based on the true
philosophy, as Ulpianus says: "Veram philosopham non
simulatam affectamus." ' And, finally, all laws are rules for
human acts performed under their consciences and have,
therefore, a bearing on salvation and the life beyond.' It is,
therefore, just and appropriate, concludes Suarez, for the
theologian to concern himself with the general nature of the
law, its various kinds and its causes and effects.
III.
A short and-by the nature of this essay-rather sketchy
description of the content of De Legibus and a "case study"
of one of its more than 240 chapters will best serve us as
an illustration of Suarez' argument.
He divides the treatise on the Laws into ten books, each
containing between twenty and forty chapters (with the exception of Book Ten, which contains only eight). The ten
books treat their subject matter under the following titles:
Book 1-On the Law in general, its causes and effects;
Book 2-On the Eternal Law, the Natural Law and the
Law of Nations (Jus gentium);

Book 3-On the positive, man-made law, or the Civil
Law (i.e., secular as opposed to ecclesiastical
law);
8 C,I,S 1 DI, 1: cp. also Inst. II,IJ,: Juris prudentia est divinarum atque
humanarum verum notitia ...
9 This rather elaborated discussion in the preface to De Legibus was pro-

voked by a heated controversy current at that time. Banez, O.P., held that the
theory of Law was of no concern to the theologian, whereas Cano, Molina,
Suarez and many others insisted that a comprehensive knowledge of the Law
and of the concrete circumstances of social life were indispensable to a mastery
of Moral Theology. Fr. Pelster, in ScHrOLASTIR XVII, 410 (1942), remarks in
discussing this controversy that Banez was less true to the principles of the
Thomist School at Salamanca than were his opponents.
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Book 4-On the positive ecclesiastical (or Canon) law;
Book 5-On the variety of human law, especially on
penal (criminal) and onerous (i.e., tax) laws;
Book 6-On the interpretation, the changing and the
cessation of positive human laws;
Book 7-On the unwritten law, which is also called customary law;
Book 8-On Privileges;
Book 9-On the Divine Law of the Old Testament;
and
Book 10--On -the New Divine Law (i.e., that of the
New Testament).
Let us now make a brief survey of the content of one of
these books as it is presented in the titles of its chapters;
for example, the content of Book Three on the positive
human, or civil, law in general and especially-as Suarez
significantly points out-on the national laws,'" the laws of
Spain, let us say, or France. The first question is: Do men
by nature possess a power to legislate; or is this power theirs
only by accident (i.e., not required by the very nature of
man); or is this power a consequence of original sin and,
therefore, as some protestant sects, the Anabaptists for instance, contended, not necessary for the elect? The answer
given is that the power to legislate follows, first from the
social and political nature of man by force of which he lives
in communities, one of which is the state, the perfect society
in which that social nature finds its comparative perfection;
and, it follows further, that in any community, especially
10 The Jus dvile was throughout the Middle Ages the Roman civil
law;
but with the development of the nation-state it slowly acquired a second meaning,
that of national law. While during the Middle Ages the Glossatores and the
Post-glossatores contended that the Civil Law-and the laws of the Roman
Empire-continued to be valid for the new Christian Empire, Vittoria, Suarez
and his contemporaries contend that the Roman civil law, as such, is not valid
and was never valid, not even during the Middle Ages all over the "Christiatt
world," that neither the Emperor nor the Pope ever had the power to promulgate civil (i.e., secular or temporal) laws for all Christendom as, for instance,
Bartolus taught for the Emperor and Augustinus Triumphus for the Pope.
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in the perfect community, there must be a directive and-in
order to realize the common good by achieving unity and
order in the coordinated acts of all its members-coercive
authority to legislate. Since men are mituraliter not governed by angels nor immediately by God, it follows that
they must be governed by men. The second chapter, therefore, asks: In which men resides, by nature, this power to
legislate or to rule? Some canonists answered that it resided in Adam, as Lord Filmer also held in his paternal
theory of monarchy, and that Adam then transferred it to
his successors, i.e., the princes. But that answer is wholly
unacceptable. For by nature this power could not reside in
any particular person, but only in the community itself.
All men are born free, and none has any political jurisdiction or dominion over the others; consequently, this power
must reside originally with the community itself. The third
chapter asks the question if, since all power is derived from
God, this power to legislate is immediately given by God as
the Creator of human nature. The answer is that God is,
of course, the ultimate source of all power, but that He
gives this power to legislate, not by a particular and special
act distinct from the act of creating human nature, but as
a necessary consequence of that nature according to the
principle that he who gives the form gives also all that which
by nature belongs to the form. As man, because he is created
as a rational being, has the power over himself, his faculties and his limbs as respects their use, and is naturaliter
free and sui juris, so the body politic, as soon as it is born
by a kind of social compact, has this power of self-rule. Yet
this does not mean that the people, i.e., the political community in its original democratic form, could not transfer
or, as for instance on account of an unjust war, lose this
power. By consent this power may be transferred with
certain conditions or without conditions upon one man or a
group of men. In the fourth chapter, the Corollark are presented, of which the most important is that all forms of
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government are of merely positive man-made law and that,
therefore, the Divine Right Theory is utterly untenable; for
every ruler in monarchical governments and every group of
persons in aristocratic governments holds the power to legislate by transfer, has it immediately from the people. To the
body politic itself, to the people ruling themselves in original
direct democracy, belongs the constituent power. Another
interesting point is made-and extensively discussed in
Chapters Six and Seven-namely, that the division of the
world into a plurality of independent and free, i.e., sovereign,
states is quite natural. Never was the Roman Emperor the
ruler of the world, not even of the Christian world; the Civil
Law of the Roman Emperors is not binding on the inhabitants of Portugal, nor was it ever received by custom in
Spain in such a way that where the positive law of Spain is
silent, the Civil Law should be observed. Spain is ruled by
its national (propria) law and when this law is silent, the
judge should apply the rule of reason, should decide ex
aequo et bono and neither apply the Canon Law nor the (Roman) Civil Law in a civil matter. As limited as is the emperor
in the power to legislate for the universe in temporal (civil)
matters, so also is the Pope denied the prerogative for the
universe in temporalibus; there does not exist such direct
power of the Pope in temporalibus over the world. One sees
here that the medieval concept of a world-monarchy resting
on an identity of Church, resp. Christianity, and Imperium
has faded away as unreal and somewhat fantastic. Meanwhile the pagan states of the Americas had been discovered,
and the narrow world of the Middle Ages expanded quickly.
The conquistadores used the arguments stemming from the
concept of Pope or Emperor as Lord of the World to justify
their conquests. The theologians from Vittoria on reject and
ridicule these arguments, whether they have as their source
Aristotle's defense of slavery (some men are by nature free:
some, by nature slave) or the pamphlets of the Legists and
the Curialists of the Middle Ages who defended the theses
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explicitly-the former that the Emperor, and the latter that
the Pope was the Lord of the World and could, consequently,
transfer the rule over the newly discovered territories to
Christian Princes. This point is again discussed in Chapters
Ten and Eleven. Thus we see the abandonment of the
medieval political ideologies according to which the empire
was considered to be an historical continuation of the Roman
Empire of antiquity and identical with Christendom, i.e., the
"World," and according to which the Christian Faith was
considered the basis of political unity and of citizenship with
the consequence of an almost inseparable intertwining of
secular civil law and ecclesiastical law. These ideologies of
the Legist and the Curialist are seen as merely historical
justifications of an historical ideal, not of an ever-valid political ideal. Instead, the state is firmly and exclusively based
on the Natural Law. Its limitations as against the Churchthe Church is universal; of states there are, quite naturally,
many-and as against the realm of the person are firmly
established. I am of the opinion that what Suarez has to
say in these chapters will offer the best foundation for a
satisfactory solution of the modern problem of the relations
between the Church and the modern democrafic and religiously neutral (not indifferent) State.11 Suarez' efforts to
delineate on the basis of the Natural Law by stressing the
rights of the person, the right of self-determination of the
body politic, the definite circumscription of the term bonum
commune politicum furnished in his excellent theory that
the bonum commune arises out of and regularly coincides
with the bonum of the persons that form the community are,
similarly, a most fruitful theory upon which a right balance
between individual rights and liberties and social interests
and responsibilities may be based. Suarez' passages on liberty of the person, his accentuation of Jus as meaning
"rights" and not only the objective Justum are signs of a
11 The author has tried to do this in Ch. 25 and 26 of his book, Tmm
IN CATHOLiC THOUGHT, Herder Book Co., St. Louis, Mo., 2nd ed., 1947.
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humanist and Christian Personalism to which our time
should be especially receptive as an alternative to the threatening all-provident state, which in the name of a tremendously enlarged concept of the common good forgets the
primary principle of social philosophy, namely that of Subsidiarity."2 It is neither the duty nor the right of the state
to make everybody happy in his private life. The state
produces only those conditions in his legal and social order
in which the individual person perfects his own individual
happiness.
The next chapters of Book Three of De Legibus deal
with the Macchiavellian theories according to which the ruler
of the state or republic acting in its interests (such interests
identified with the common good) is not bound by law and
morals. Against such doctrines of the "politici"--as Suarez
somewhat contemptuously calls the Macchiavellian writersthe point is made that the moral law and the moral value
are themselves part and parcel of the common good so that,
therefore, their violation can never be justified under any
appeal to the realization of the common good.
Two other problems are treated consequently, the first
raising the question whether the state can command and
punish an internal act. Suarez answers with a clear, "No."
As an example he distinguishes between the internal intention to commit murder and the attempt to execute that
intention by appropriate external acts. By its very nature
the inner sphere of the person is closed to the state which
must and can be satisfied with the conformity of the external
acts to its laws concerning the external peace and honesty
12 In Book 2, Chapter 14 of De Legibus, Suarez asserts that Liberty, i.e.
the dominium suae libertatis is of positive natural law. Nature makes men free.
positive (Ut sic dicum) with the intrinsic Right of liberty; and only the Body
Politic may take away a man's liberty ex justa causa-as, for instance, in punishment for crimes, just as it may, in capital punishment, take away a man's life.
But no man and no prince may under claim of an absolute power (potentia
absoluta) take away a man's liberty or property which action would be absurdissima, against peace and justice, and against the right given to everybody by
nature (nr. 13-19 of the above-given chapter.)
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of the human community. 18 In- Chapter Fourteen the problem of the ex post facto law, as we would say today, is discussed in the form of the question: Can an actus practeritus be the matter of human law, i.e., can an act that
was not punishable when it was committed or performed be
made punishable retroactively? The answer, again, is a
clear, "No," with the one exception that if the act were a
grave violation of first and generally known principles of
Natural Law, a later human law would have full effect (since
it is merely declaring an act to be a crime which would be
recognized as a crime even without the specific declaration
by the human law). The Nurenberg trials are a case in this
respect. Nevertheless, the strict rule is that no ex post facto
law is within the competence of the human law, for by its
very nature it is a precept and thus concerned only with
future acts.
These few examples of the wealth of learning and thought
to be found in these few chapters of but one of the ten
books of De Legibus will, I hope, show -that the testimonials
given at the beginning of this short sketch of Suarez' thought
are more than justified. It was a hard choice for me to
make as to which book to discuss; for it would have been
just as interesting-or even more so-to have given a representation of the doctrine of Natural Law or of the clarification of the concept of the Jus Gentium for which Suarez is
rightly famous and which he treats extensively in the twenty
chapters of Book Two of De Legibus. It is hoped, in conclusion, that the preceding lines may resuscitate the interest
of jurists and students of jurisprudence in this great work
of Suarez "from which all can profit greatly."1
Heinrick A. Rommen, LL.D.
13 Under certain circumstances the internal act is indirectly under the power
of the State: a soldier ordered to guard the entrance to a fortress must not only
be present and awake; he must also watch attentively and conscientiously, for
without these internal acts the external act of watching is incomplete. C. 13, hr. 11.
14 DeLagarde in Neuvele Revue Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger
(Feb. 1929) in his review of Die Staatslehre des Franz Suarez.

